Suchergebnisse

Intro -- Contents -- Introduction -- Detailed Content -- What is nihilism? -- The epistemological liar -- Unnatural certainties -- Trivialism, nihilism and philosophy -- What is dogmatism? -- There is no truth, there might be nothing -- The thinkability of Nothing -- How many (true) contradictions are there? -- The importance of being noneist -- Was Hegel noneist? -- Nihilism in Italy -- Hegel's interpretation of Megarian paradoxes -- Conclusion -- Notes -- References.

AbstractThis article is a preliminary presentation of conjunctive paraconsistency, the claim that there might be non-explosive true contradictions, but contradictory propositions cannot be considered separately true. In case of true 'p and not p', the conjuncts must be held untrue, Simplification fails. The conjunctive approach is dual to non-adjunctive conceptions of inconsistency, informed by the idea that there might be cases in which a proposition is true and its negation is true too, but the conjunction is untrue, Adjunction fails. While non-adjunctivism is a well-known option, the other view is not so much studied nowadays, but it was not unknown in the tradition, and there are some positive suggestions, in recent literature, that the position is plausible and deserves to be developed. The article compares conjunctivism, non-adjunctivism and dialetheism, then focuses on some possible justifications, costs and benefits of the conjunctive view.

La tesi che ho cercato di sviluppare in Analitici e continentali (1997) e in molti scritti successivi, è che la diversificazione delle due tradizioni A (analitica) e C (continentale) è la ricaduta pratica e istituzionale dell'assenza di una chiara consapevolezza collettiva circa che cosa sia la filosofia, quali siano i suoi compiti e metodi, e in che cosa si differenzi da altre scienze o attività intellettuali. Tale assenza potrebbe non essere di per sé problematica, se non fosse che la filosofia, almeno a partire dall'idealismo tedesco, è diventata una disciplina accademica, e attraverso un processo iniziato nel secondo Ottocento e giunto a compimento all'incirca nella seconda metà del secolo successivo, ha acquisito l'assetto istituzionale di una collezione di discipline specializzate, che dovrebbero operare in modo simile a tutte le altre scienze e discipline.Quando una forma di sapere si struttura come una scienza senza avere (o senza voler avere) una chiara e uniforme coscienza di sé, si generano due conseguenze. La prima è che, come osservava già Aristotele, si diffonde e trionfa la "falsa scienza", ovvero la "simulazione di sapienza" prolifica in modo incontrollato. Si produce allora una grande quantità di filosofia nominale, che tende sopraffare e annientare gli scarsi residui di filosofia sostanziale. La seconda è che si determinano controversie intellettuali, culturali e metodologiche, che a lungo andare diventano facilmente manipolabili, e vengono utilizzate per le più basse e ignobili manovre di potere.È quanto è accaduto alla distinzione A-C. Il testo ricostruisce brevemente questa vicenda e mostra come la storia recente della diversificazione abbia portato a una specie di disastro intellettuale e morale, che interessa tutta la filosofia, e ha forme particolarmente problematiche nella filosofia A (o presunta tale). ; The text is divided into two part. First, a brief reconsideration of the history and theory of the "analytic-continental divide" is presented, then an assessment of the contemporary situation is suggested.In the first part, it is explained that the A-C distinction dates back to the end of the XIX century, and is completely acknowledged at the middle of the XX century. The two categories intend to capture a general divergence within the field of philosophy, a divergence that does not properly regard currents of movements or philosophical trends, but "traditions". Two different lines of canonical authors, two conceptions of philosophy, two different philosophical stiles largely confront each other. Various projects of possible convergence have been presented (the most authoritative were the ones of Apel and Tugendhat), but they have generally remained undeveloped, basically because some different (cultural and not philosophical) controversies have been interposed, such the controversy about "post-modernism". In the second part, it is suggested that two new factors have intervened in recent times: the globalization of knowledge, and the scientization of philosophy. To a certain extent, the emergence of the A-C question, at the middle of the XX century, was due to the announcing occurrence of both. But both globalization and scientization do make the divide, in its proper sense, to vanish. There are no traditions in philosophy yet, but there are distinct, parallel and non-communicating disciplines. So the A-C distinction lack any properly meta-philosophical significance, and also remains as a political instrument of academic dominance, that survives only nominally, mainly to authorize exclusion or inclusion of researchers and research programs.

Over the course of his career, Gianni Vattimo has assumed a number of public and private identities and has pursued multiple intellectual paths. He seems to embody several contradictions, at once defending and questioning religion and critiquing and serving the state. Yet the diversity of his life and thought form the very essence of, as he sees it, the vocation and responsibility of the philosopher. In a world that desires quantifiable results and ideological expediency, the philosopher becomes the vital interpreter of the endlessly complex. As he outlines his ideas about the philosopher's role, Vattimo builds an important companion to his life's work. He confronts questions of science, religion, logic, literature, and truth, and passionately defends the power of hermeneutics to engage with life's conundrums. Vattimo conjures a clear vision of philosophy as something separate from the sciences and the humanities but also intimately connected to their processes, and he explicates a conception of truth that emphasizes fidelity and participation through dialogue